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Preface
The theologian and philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher was not
only the founder of modern Platonic scholarship, but also acknowl-
edged as his master by August Boeckh, who in his turn ranks with
Gottfried Hermann as one of the twin founders of modern classical
scholarship in general. In a striking passage of his Aesthetik, he remarks
about the need to ground the appreciation of a work of art in its
historical context:
So ist also eigentlich ein Kunstwerk auch eingewurzelt in seinen Grund
und Boden, in seine Umgebung. Es verliert schon seine Bedeutung,
wenn es aus dieser Umgebung herausgerissen wird und in den Verkehr
ubergeht. Es ist wie etwas, das aus dem Feuer gerretet ist und nun
Brandflecken tragt.
Really and truly then a work of art is also rooted in its native soil, its
ambience. It loses its significance, if it is wrenched out of this ambience
and put into circulation. It is like something rescued from the fire,
still bearing the marks of its burning.
This does not mean that the work of art does not possess absolute
value. But its origins can never be neglected.
G. W. F. Hegel, who lectured in the 1820s on aesthetics alternately
with Schleiermacher at Berlin, was to repeat this insistence. Even
though in the last analysis the identity of particular characters and
particular historical details taken up into the work of art may no
longer be important, we must check their credentials before they
disappear.
Nowadays a student in a typical department of philosophy would
probably scan the lecture lists for a course on aesthetics in vain. But
both Hegel and Schleiermacher were philosophers, and the striking
feature of their aesthetic theories is that they do not wish to exclude
philosophy— artistically presented philosophy, as Greek philosophy
is— from them. The form is part of the content and, in the Greek
world, the form raised certain expectations in its audience. A phil-
osophical poem, for example, was not simply a prose discourse coated
with literary, and on the whole rather regrettable, sugar. That is not
true even of the Lucretius who uses this image. Nor is a dialogue
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merely a convenient pedagogic means of setting out simply views
which otherwise might tax or fatigue the amateur reader with his
limited attention span. All ancient literary forms are grounded in
and structured by pre-literary, and certainly pre-philosophical, usages.
They presuppose at least one interlocutor: many of them presuppose
in that role the whole polis, even the pan-Hellenic community. A
polis might well offer a more motley and less schooled audience than
that of the university lecture. Yet the authors who present themselves
before it will be alert to their listeners' diversity. Schleiermacher was
a Prussian clergyman, but he understood amazingly well that literary
art cannot always be taken au grand serieux :
Die Kunst beweist daher ihre Freiheit durch die spielende und losere
Seite, und ihre innere Notwendigkeit durch die symbolische und
hohere. (Die groBten Kiinstler zeigen uns dieses Zusammengehoren
oft in einer sehr leicht mifiverstandlichen Unmittelbarkeit . . .).
Art therefore shows its freedom through the playful, less trammelled
side, and its inner necessity through its symbolic, higher side. (The
greatest artists show us this relation quite often with a very easily
misunderstood directness.)
Among the examples of this he cites Shakespeare, whose puns are
defended, and Plato.
Wilamowitz used to speak of the disaster that overtook German
education in the nineteenth century. It has taken a long time for the
modern interpreter of Plato or Aristotle to rise to Schleiermacher's
insight, that a Greek philosophical work is essentially an act of
dialogue. Schleiermacher added to the statement of his Aesthetik a
whole hermeneutic doctrine. It had a twofold import. The interpreter
must concern himself carefully with the elucidation of the meaningful
connections within language. He must also seek for the formation of
language and its thought-content within the creative individuality of
the speaker or author
This sanctions in the event both grammatical and psychological
explanation. Grammar will naturally concern itself not only with the
details of linguistic forms, but also with the entire context of language
and its spiritual content. Psychology will seek the origin of language
in the creative spiritual processes within the author's individuality.
The original creative process led from psychology— what Schleier-
macher calls the Keimentschluss or seminal decision— to grammar.
Understanding the author leads from grammar to psychology.
Yet, although every student of Wilamowitz or his pupil Eduard
Fraenkel on the poets will recognize these scholars as in Schleier-
macher's tradition, the literary or pre-philosophical approach to
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philosophers has often seemed arbitrary and irrelevant, as irrelevant
as talk about "spirit." Gottlob Frege said that logical explanation in
his day was "psychologisch verseucht," "sick to death with psychology."
If a man is concerned with truth, why trouble about his cast of mind?
And if he says what he means, in a close, naked, natural way of
speaking, do style and convention matter?
But the notion that we have access to the truth (whatever that
may mean) through abstractions, which really means in an inhuman
way, is an illusion. What is accessible is thought, and thought is
clothed in language. Hence the philosopher and the philologist do
in fact meet in a common quest.
The student of Greek philosophy then must know Greek. But
more than this. He must study the prejudices and expectations about
etiquette of a society often tantalizingly different from our own.
There is an etiquette even of the intellect. We have been taught to
crave the absolute, and wars have been fought by those who were
convinced they had this privileged key to reality. The Greeks certainly
fought enough wars. But their civilization in its best moments was
based on the recognition of compromise. There is no absolute right
in the Iliad, and the Odyssey ?, right is only that of a man to his wife
and family and home. The delicate reserve that pervades the Greek
of Plato and Menander, philosopher and poet, with its play of particles,
its optatives, its modal verbs, is a noble Athenian contribution to this
national insight.
Compromise is the basis of political life, and the dinner party was
peculiarly the place where such compromises were evident. Again,
already Homer knew this, when in the Odyssey he condemned the
Centaurs, and this is the symbolism of the meal at which Priam and
Achilles learn to accept death at the end of the Iliad. Xenophanes
shows that the religious and philosophical meal persisted, as it does
in the Symposia of both Plato and Xenophon.
But to accept this ambience and this language is already to place
limitations on the kind of truth at which such inquiries may arrive,
since who is very clear next day about what seemed so plausible the
night before? Who has not yielded a point for the sake of his table
companions and his host which more privately he might have cherished
to the death? What is important about these occasions is not so much
the absolute claims of whatever truth was agreed, since even agree-
ment may only be an agreement to differ, but our impressions about
the character of our fellow guests. And there we may well set more
store by the man who was able to lighten a heavy moment with a
well-timed anecdote that raised a laugh than by the professor who
set out to summarize the views of Kant for his glassy-eyed listeners.
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These are the kinds of boundaries between which Plato so often
moves, even when he abandons the formal setting of the dinner party
while retaining the essential dialogue (the "feast of words"). The
vexatious imprecision of his arguments is rightly pinpointed by
scholars. Paradoxically, it has never affected his status as one of the
greatest luminaries of our civilization. This is because everyone
recognizes that a-Kopia may sometimes be the right strategy in certain
kinds of discourse, in company, certainly, but also in encounter with
the numinous. St. Augustine's omnia exeunt in mysterium is simply
another way of putting this. Both sorts of discourse coalesce at a
locus with which, as the instance of Xenophanes already mentioned
proves, pagan antiquity was perfectly well acquainted, the sacred
meal.
We need not go as far back as Augustine. The end of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is familiar. Increasingly nowadays, when
we are seeking to do justice to the oeuvre, Wittgenstein's life and
character also enter into evidence; his quixotic village schoolmaster-
ing, his service as a hospital porter. Coming from the British empirical
tradition, Sir Frederick Ayer in the 1930s took the Viennese Circle
to which Wittgenstein belonged to be saying that metaphysical asser-
tions, since they could not be empirically validated, were worthless.
What they were really saying is that they were nonsense. But nonsense
has its rights too, and this is also part of one kind of British, or
English, tradition. It is curious that anyone from the same University
and College as Lewis Carroll, the mathematician Charles Dodgson,
should not have understood this. In the face of the mystery constituted
by the universe {''alles, was der Fall ist") perplexity is a proper
reaction, and statements in and about the presence of mystery may
well be technically nonsensical. There is no techne to deal with them,
and this is seen exactly at the moment in any civilization when
technical knowledge is promising its best fruits and is becoming best
understood. But since this means that the claim to reduce the universe
to a matter of technical expertise is fraught with uncharted difficulties,
absolute knowledge of the truth (to be totally sophos) is hybris for all
men. All that is left is philo-sophia, and the philo-sophos must exhibit
sophrosyne, not simply as a demonstration of disinterested morals, but
as the proof of his fitness for his profession. Pythagoras, another
mathematician, was the first to speak of the philosophos. It is part of
the same mentality that he also was a religious leader.
This is why Plato, mathematician and mystic, is so concerned with
the moral stance of his participants in dialogue. Whatever the va-
gueness and ambiguities of their conclusions, which may be regarded
as inevitable, the important question, after all, is whether they are
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living out their lives honorably, authentically, or not. That is a question
that may not be avoided.
The essays printed in this volume are offered as examples of the
modern approach to Greek philosophy. Already that philosophy is
more than a synchronous dialogue. When Plato makes Socrates
interrogate Parmenides, he is paying homage to the diachronic
possibly of a "dialogue des absents," even a "dialogue des morts." In
his turn, Socrates himself spoke ambiguously to posterity, and this
posthumous conversation between old and new has continued down
the ages with all the philosophers of antiquity just as much as it has
continued with the poets.
Greek philosophy began on the fringes of its world, and perhaps
in a too little explored dialogue with non-Greek world-views already
old. Asia Minor in particular had its own contribution to make
whether to religion or art. It is right that we should give pride of
place to an examination of the first fragment of Heraclitus of Ephesus,
since the influence of Heraclitus on Plato— and on Marx— is im-
measurable. But that is why the comparison of Aristotle and Descartes
on the soul is also profoundly relevant to our inquiry. In the
intervening perspective, one of our most exciting pieces shows that
a civilization too long silent in this inherited discourse, the Arab, is
now beginning to be heard. If the conclusions drawn there are
correct, how much the modern exegete will have to learn about the
reliability of his texts ! Elsewhere, a Christian apologist is shown to
be a repository of Platonic and Stoic doctrine. What another Christian
made of the tradition in Byzantium is now revealed in a poem
published for the first time.
In elucidating the Greek thinkers, we have of course to listen very
carefully to the idioms and patterns of a language not our own. Some
ofour most distinguished contributors excel in precisely this sensitivity.
There is no way round this. Translations simply will not do. As the
study of Greek diminishes and vanishes in the educational reforms
of our time, we are both cheating our children, and impoverishing
the understanding of our civilization, in a frightening way. Since the
end of antiquity, Europe has always striven towards Greek. This is
true even of the Middle Ages, so wrongly disparaged by the Greekless
Petrarch. Thomas Aquinas had William of Moerbeke to help him,
and Dante, whose poem has after all a Greek title, paraded what bits
he thought he knew. We will not return to Chartres by ignoring
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Greek, but to a remote barbarism unknown since the second millen-
nium before Christ.
How the Greek philosophers organized their work in genres is
another basic inquiry. Plato is a supreme literary artist glittering with
kaleidoscopic contradictions, and a number of our papers focus on
different facets of his iridescent genius, including his awareness that
there are different types of time (Bergson). Is there a genre that will
accommodate all these discrepancies, and is it perhaps what Plato
always said it was, dialectic?
His dramatic qualities are clearly an outgrowth of his dialectic,
and they commit him to a particular approach to truth, as the
irresolutions of the Attic dramas still attest. We are told that he was
an avid student of the mimes of Sophron, and this perhaps explains
some of his irony, which may be diagnosed as attenuated laughter
But in failing to resolve his problems more decidedly or logically, in
using faulty and imprecise methods, was he perhaps also more in
debt to the Sophists than his language prepares us to believe? Were
they much more influential as thinkers than we are commonly led to
suppose, and was the ambiguity of Plato's attitude to them the result
of the shock to the dialogic and musical principle they upheld
administered first by Aristophanes, and culminating, as he perceived
it, in the hemlock? How interesting, in any case, that he should have
sought to come to final terms with Aristophanes in a Symposium,
almost a Last Supper.
Aristotle, // maestro di color che sanno, "the master of those that
know" according to Dante, has enjoyed a chequered career in the
history of European thought. His universal brilliance is beyond
question. Is it heresy to suggest that he might have been less criticized
at certain periods if his literary dialogues with their aureum flumeyi
orationis had survived? What we have is still dialogic, one side of a
telephone conversation whose other end we cannot hear But his
laconic and staccato manner is heard too easily as dogma. This is
unfair to the teacher of Alexander the Great, and to the staggering
statement at the beginning of the Metaphysics that all men by nature
stretch out for knowledge, one of the most gloriously optimistic
remarks in history. Perhaps it is the proof that he was too much the
product of his own people, with their prejudices as well as their
strengths. Or perhaps again we have simply been in the habit of
distinguishing too sharply between the Greek and Hebrew meanings
of "know." Clearly Homer uses ei5a)q in more than an intellectual
sense, and when on the fagade of the Library of Celsus at Ephesus
we find the four allegorical statues of Sophia, Arete, Ennoia and
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Episteme we see that even in the age of Hadrian the intellectual and
moral were not separated.
Marx once asserted that he was no Marxist, and Aristotelians have
not always been faithful to their master's many-sided genius. Our
volume pleads for a continuation of dialogue, with him, with the
other thinkers discussed in it and, more largely, with all the indis-
pensable founders of our civilization who first asked the kinds of
questions that turned out to be best discussed "after physics"— after
physics and after dinner.
The Editor and Editorial Committee are grateful to the School of
Humanities, and its Director, Professor Nina Baym, for continued
interest and support.
At an early stage of planning Professor Richard Mohr of the
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham-
paign, rendered inestimable help. Sir Kenneth Dover, at that time
President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, generously secured
access for the Editor to the resources of the Oxford University
Computing Service— yet another instance of the warm hospitality
shown by the College during the academic year 1985-1986. Professor
J. L. Ackrill of Brasenose College, Professor of the History of
Philosophy in the University of Oxford; Professor R. Sorabji, Pro-
fessor of Philosophy, King's College, London; and Professor G. M.
Kerferd, Hulme Professor Emeritus, Manchester University, kindly
examined and evaluated the papers before the volume went to press.
To these distinguished scholars, and to all who helped in any way,
inadequate gratitude is now expressed.
Once again, I must thank Mrs. Mary Ellen Fryer for her labors in
putting on line some of our contributors' texts. Mr. Carl Kibler of
the Printing Services Office, University of Illinois, supervised the
PENTA side of our operations with his usual common sense and
perseverance.
Frances Stickney Newman's unceasing toil made the whole thing
possible.
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